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ABSTRACT 
The Aristotelian idea of φρόνησις (phronesis) is an invaluable resource to help amending the limits 
of deontological and consequentialist theories. It permits to free the moral decision from rules and 
standard principles and to give contextual motivations.The ethical competence, as a process of 
construction of moral judgment aimed to give reason for our choices, is a contemporary 
development of this intuition. 
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LIMITS OF ETHICS MONISM 
The two most influential theories in moral philosophy from the end of the XVIII 
century are the Kantianism and the utilitarianism. 
They have been usually considered as rival theories, but actually they converge on 
some aspects and they point out common limits1. These two theories give different 
answers to the attempt to developing a standard decision procedure to resolve moral 
dilemmas, however both believe that what is considered as ethically decisive in a 
lifespan field should enjoy the same consideration in other fields.  
Therefore, the kantianism and the utilitarianism share the idea that there is a 
unique moral principle able to orient and justify our choices. According to the 
kantianists, the moral decision is deontological, while according the utilitarianists it 
 
1 See F. Manti, Biós e pólis. Etica, politica, responsabilità per la vita, Genova University Press, 
Genova 2012, pp. 15 – 18. 
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is consequentialist; according to the former all moral obligations are categorical 
(binding a priori), according to the latter they are not. Both the decision models are 
characterized by their ethics monism.  
This led to neglect the moral judgement as the ability to correlate principles or 
general rules to specific contexts, and has led - for example -  to consider 
controversial ideals of the person founded on the autonomy (Kant) or the 
sperimentalism towards different forms of life (J. S. Mill), as the basis of the liberal 
neutrality2, and it has elided the moral conflict as the typical dimension of the 
morality. 
Even the contemporary reports, as the reports by Rawls and Harsanyi, are not so 
persuasive when trying to overcome the aforementioned limits. It is not possible here 
to discuss analytically the question3. 
Extremely and partially summarized:  
Rawls’ contractarianism and the utilitarianism follow different decision rules, but 
both the maximin rule and the principle of the medium social utility with related 
axioms and social welfare, reduce ethics to a branch of the Rational Choice Theory. 
The divergence concerns the “moral algebra” that has to be used. Harsanyi does 
not challenge the original position as an analytical tool to be used in order to define 
the justice criteria and other aspects of morality, but he opposes the Bayesian 
calculus (with the principle of equiprobability) to the maximin rule.  
In my opinion, both the aforementioned theories are subjected to at least three 
criticisms able to question their own structure: 
1. Any calculus procedure of the Game Theory can take into account that 
morality has to manage a plurality of factors coming from specific contexts and 
with contextual and biographical dimensions. 
2. The requirements imposed by the rationality of the calculus make marginal the 
psychological and the emotional dimensions which have – on the contrary – a 
relevant impact on orientations and conducts.   
3. The Rational Choice Theory is based on basic conditions of internal 
consistency (axiom of contraction and axiom of expansion) which limit the 
decision to this consistency. This limit is excessive and inadequate when 
applied to moral and social decisions4.  
 
2 I do not discuss here the questions related to the relationship between ethics and politics. I only 
want to underline how monistic moral theories have insisted on giving an ethical justification and not 
only a political justification of the principle of neutrality. For an in-depth analysis, see F. Manti, La 
neutralità politica come principio deontologico, in “Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics”,  vol. 17, n. 3, 
2015, pp. 247-261. 
3 For an in-depth analysis see F. Manti, Bios e polis, op. cit. pp.18 – 41. 
4 See A. Sen, Rationality and Freedom, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts, pp.121-157; F. Manti, Scelte di mercato. Una teoria della decisione ragionevole, in 
AA.VV., Etica ed economia il binomio possibile, Sentieri Meridiani, Foggia 2010, pp. 29 - 35. In 
particular, the internal consistency required by these axioms is not able to take into account real 
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Even the revision of the theory of justice proposed by Rawls in Political Liberalism 
arrives at a theory of decision based on the overlapping consensus that does not 
respond convincingly to the need to relate general principles and rules to specific 
contexts in order to obtain indications to face and – if possible – resolve moral 
dilemmas. As a matter of fact, the object of this consensus is restricted to the basic 
structure of a well-ordered society 5.   
AN  INTUITION  OF ARISTOTLE 
As defined by C. Larmore, an invaluable resource to help amending the limits of 
deontological and consequentialist theories, is given by the Aristotelian idea of 
φρόνησις (phronesis)6, which is fundamental to understand what is the moral 
judgement, since it permits to free the moral decision from rules and standard 
principles and to give contextual motivations.  
Before defining the idea of φρόνησις, Aristotle gives a methodological indication 
related to the arguments concerning human behaviours and, precisely, referring to 
their precision. Though φρόνησις is a dianoetic virtue,   they are not epistemic, since 
they do not affirm an incontrovertible truth, but “[…] ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ […]”7, that is 
“mostly”. Their grade of truth is approximate also because if we start from 
preconditions carrying these traits, the conclusions have to be of the same type. 
Therefore, the precision of our expressions in this field is as high as permitted by the 
nature of the object.  
The following example is illuminating:”παραπλήσιον γάρ φαίνεται μαθηματκοῦ τε 
πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν αποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.”8. That is: 
expecting precision from “mostly” preconditions “would be, more or less, admitting 
that a mathematician counts on persuasion and a rhetorician on rigorous 
demonstrations.”.  
 
context conditions characterized by their dynamism or variations (always possible) in the information 
we have (see A. Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, “Econometrica”, Vol. 61, N..3, pp. 495 - 521). 
Outside the assumption of situations with a high level of abstraction, as the original position, the 
calculus that follows the internal consistency axioms of the Rational Choice Decision shows all its 
limits. This is true also for a probabilistic calculus as the one of the function of the average utility (or 
function of social utility) since it is influenced by the attribution of values of utility to the different 
individual utilities. Harsanyi, though, does not have difficulties to accept the original position as a sort 
of heuristic assumption able to clarify several aspects of morality.  
 5See J Rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, 
pp. 133 – 172.   For a discussion on the consent by intersection, see F. Manti, Bios e polis, op. cit., pp. 
74 – 80. 
6 See C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, p. xii. 
7Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1094 b 21. 
8Ivi, I, 1094 b 25 – 27.  
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Therefore, judgement is not elaborated thanks to general rules but taking into 
account the context in which we act: “ […] τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν […] “9.  
This also means that moral judgment does not have to deal with formal rules, but 
with life activities where examples, experiences, education have a fundamental role. 
The φρόνησις allows us to choose the best behavior in every context. Aristotle 
specifies how it is a customary state of mind, accompanied by reason and addressed 
to action, which pertains to what is good or evil for man10. The good action, 
therefore, is, in itself, an aim (ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπρασξία τέλος)11. It follows that, 
according to Aristotle, there is a connection between truth and good. In summary, 
φρόνησις, like all the dianoetic virtues, allows us to reason correctly and approximate 
the truth: the logos recognizes what is true and so desire accords to it. The ὀρθός 
λόγος (orthόs lόgos), that is the right reason, is therefore to deliberate what we have 
the most reason to do as appropriate to the context in which we are and to the 
promotion of good life12. 
The dissertation on φρόνησις, proposed by Aristotle in the VI Book of 
Nicomachean Ethics13, on a hand further specifies his vision of this virtue, on the 
other hand it underlines some difficulties.   
By the way, I consider very interesting that – in spite of what happens with σοφία 
(sophia) – Aristotle does not give a real definition of φρόνησις but – in order to 
understand it – he refers to people considered as wise. Aristotle textually affirms: 
“Πεπὶ δὲ φπονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβομεν τοὺς φρονίμους”14. Wise is he who has the 
ability to decide what is good or is appropriate15 to him, not in a specific field, but in 
general, for a good life. His characteristic is the ability to decide “ […] εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ 
βουλευτικός “16, since he does not demonstrate. The demonstration regards what 
cannot be different from what actually is, while the demonstration requires to 
evaluate and discuss the principles that can be different from what they actually are. 
When we refer to our behaviours, we talk about things that “[…] ἐνδεχέται καὶ ἄλλως 
 
9 Ivi, II, 1104 a 9. 
10 J. Annas proposed to translate φρόνησις with intelligence. It concerns good life in general. See J. 
Annas, The Moral of Happiness, Oxford University Press, New York - Oxford 1993, pp. 73-74. 
11Aristotle,  Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 1140 b 7. 
12 See ivi, VI, 1140 to 27- 28. For a closer look at the subject, see M. Mangini, Etica democratica. 
Una riflessione sui valori etici nella società liberale, Giappichelli, Torino 2013, pp. 61 - 64 e pp. 69 – 72. 
For a different interpretation, from the one I propose, of the ὀρθός λόγος, understood as reasoning 
capable of correctly deriving from the first and universal principles of being coherent conclusions of a 
logical and ontological order, see L. Clavell, La presenza di Aristotele nell’enciclica Fides et ratio, in S. 
L. Brock (ed), L’attualità di Aristotele, Armando, Roma 2000, p. 162. 
13 See ivi, VI, 1140 a 24 – 1140 b 30. 
14 See ivi, VI, 1140 a 24. 
15Aristotle uses the words τὰ συμφέποντα which can be also translated as what is useful, 
convenient, beneficial. 
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 1140 a 26 – 27. The use of the word βουλευτικός is relevant 
because it indicates also the use of the ability of political decision. (See Aristotle, Politica, 1260 a 12) 
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ἔχειν”17, can be different. Therefore, wise are people who can judge (θεωρεῖν) upon 
what is good for themselves and for other men.  
It is evident that with this statement Aristotle wants to specify that wisdom regards 
the decision related to other people too, underlining – with the example referred to 
Pericles – the political dimension in addition to the ethical dimension18. 
Once defined the conditions where the moral judgment is acquired and its 
function, we have to answer to the question related to the modalities through which 
we build it or to the way we exercise this faculty. Aristotle gives us two clues: the 
theory of mediety and the practical syllogism.  
With regard to the further, we have to underline this passage “Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀπετὴ 
ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ 
φπόνιμος ὁρίσειεν”19.  
Without considering refined philological debates, in my opinion ὡρισμένῃ is 
referred to mediety toward ourselves and is made possible by the ὀρθός λόγος. In 
other words, virtue consists in the ability to appropriately face the requirements 
which emerge from a determined situation, avoiding excesses of any kind.  
Aristotle underlines also that it is difficult to practice ethical virtues as mediety. It 
is difficult to look for and find the middle path as it is difficult to find the centre of 
the circle: it is not for all, but only for he who has a full knowledge (εἰδότως) of the 
subject. 
He also underlines some rules of behaviour able to define what really is the 
mediety towards ourselves20, but as Larmore argues: “[…]only judgement can shape 
their vagueness and transform them in significant provisions.”21. 
In the III Book of Nicomachean Ethics, when analysing the deliberation22 (βουλή 
and βούλευσις)23 and giving causes for reflection on the practical reasoning, Aristotle 
does not give indications on its form and if and to which extent is it oriented by 
considerations concerning virtue. The moral decision, as said, regards cases that 
“mostly” happen, whose result is uncertain, and where there is indefiniteness.  
In this context of ideas, Aristotle identifies the syllogistic type of the structure of 
the moral decision (which we do not have to forget has a contextual character and 
does not concern the aims but the means which conduct to the aims). This structure 
is as follows:  
 
Major premise: what is considered as what has to be done 
 
17Ivi, VI, 1140 a 35. 
18 See ivi, 1140 b 7-11  
19 Ivi, II, 1106 b 36 – 1107 a 1-2 «Virtue, so, is a disposition that orients decision following a 
mediety towards ourselves, defined by reason and as defined by he who is wise» 
20 See ivi, II, 1109 b 2 – 26. 
21 C. Larmore,  Patterns of Moral Complexity, op. cit., p. 18. 
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 1112 a 18 – 1113 a 14. 
23 The two words cannot be considered as synonyms. 
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Minor premise: means through which I do what I affirmed in the major premise 
(given the context) 
_____________________________ 
 
Conclusion: the accomplished aim 
 
It is evident that the premises imply the moral judgment and that it precedes and 
permits to formulate the premises from which the conclusion is inferred. In the light 
of these considerations, I think that Larmore is right when he affirms that the 
practical syllogism cannot be considered as a model able to explain how the moral 
judgment works24. 
THE HETEROGENEITY OF MORALITY 
The modern alternatives to the Aristotelian intuition regarding the moral 
judgement do not seem convincing. The third formulation of the Kantian categorical 
imperative and the idea of a moral algebra able to calculate which is the decision that 
produces more social wellness, respond to the same requirement: determining the 
moral obligation in the light of a unique and universally valid impartial principle as 
rationally justifiable, the deontological principle or the consequentialist principle of 
utility. The critics that Rawls moves to the utilitarianism and the critics by Harsanyi 
to the deontological neocontractualism of the further underline (both and mutually) 
the limits of the ethical monism, whichever its declination is.  I think, therefore, as 
sharable what said by Larmore:  
The correct point of view, in my opinion, is that there is the deontological reasoning, 
the consequentialist reasoning, and both are valid ways of morally reasoning. The 
mistake made by both the utilitarianists and Kantianians consists in claiming that only 
one of these principles can be licit. And I think that it can exist more than a moral 
reasoning and that we have to admit the multiplicity of these ways 25.  
The existence of a multiplicity of ways of reasoning on the right action to do in 
order to pursue other people’s good, implies the acknowledgement of the heterogeneity 
of the moral as a matter of fact of our experience. Depending on the contexts, we 
decide and choose moral actions giving deontological or consequentialist reasons. 
This experience also shows that not always the moral decision requires impartiality. 
There are some peculiar categories of people, groups or individuals with whom we 
have special relationship that can be related to ways of life like interests: toward these 
 
24 See C. Larmore,  Patterns of Moral Complexity, op. cit., p. 8. 
25 C. Larmore, Dare ragioni, Rosemberg & Sellier, Torino 2008, p. 34 (The text has been published 
only in Italian since it is the report of a lesson, authorized by the Author). 
389         The Moral Decision: from Phronesis to Ethical Competence 
 
people we can act in a preferential way in determined circumstances and conditions, 
justifying these preferential actions.  
Therefore, we should place side by side to the deontological and consequentialist 
principles the principle of partiality “[...] following which we have to respect the 
specific and particular relationships we have towards the others and we have to act for 
their good in the light of these special bonds we have with them.”26. 
In addition, always in the light of our moral experience, it is possible to note that, in 
our social relationships, we are asked to justify some decisions determined not only by 
considerations on principles, but also by the convergence of contextual factors 
(included education and tradition), intersubjective and negotiation relationships, 
motivations generated from our moral loyalties, our “moral feelings” and emotions.  
Our moral experience shows that we have to face daily obligations like keeping 
promises, be honest, return others what we owe them, whose rules do not require in 
many occasions a particular processing on the moral side.   
Other obligations like - for example -  being benevolent, generous or fair, require a 
reflection on when do we have to follow them, how can we realize them, which 
consequences will have our actions on the others: in other words, they require the 
processing of the moral judgement. There are also circumstances where the moral 
judgement is solicited or induced by passions, or, as we say nowadays, by emotions. 
The emotional impact of situations like suffering, inequality, etc. can contribute to 
generate a moral reflection on how should we act to avoid them or, at least, to limit 
their impacts. Aristotle had foreseen a relation between good and passions to the point 
that he thought that sometimes they could even coincide27. Friendship with ourselves is 
considered in itself as a mutual agreement among reason and passions28. The vast 
majority of modern ethics has elided passions from the moral dimension. Thanks to the 
philosophers of the moral sense like Shaftesbuty, Hutchenson, Hume, A. Smith, the 
emotional dimension of the moral has been underlined, to the point that Hume could 
consider passions (at that time passion meant emotion) as the ground where morality 
grows.  
Among these philosophers, he who underlined more than others the importance of 
the moral judgement was A. Smith. Apart from underlining that justice rules are the 
only rules of morality to be precise, while the rules regarding virtues are unprecise, 
vague and undetermined he also underlined that virtues are connected with a general 
rule or with a way of acting, and, at the same time, integrated with the moral feeling 
proper of each of them.  
This feeling is exposed to several changes depending on the contexts. A. Smith has 
defined sympathy as the ability of putting yourself in someone else’s shoes and to care 
for his/her wellbeing, that is the moral sentiment par excellence29.  
 
26 Ivi, p. 37. 
27 See Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, VII, 12, 1245 b 1-2.  
28 See Aristotle, Magna Moralia, II, 11, 1211 a 33 -  37. 
29 See A. Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 
11- 18. 
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Referring explicitly to Hume and A. Smith, Hoffman has proposed an interesting 
theory of the relationship among empathy and moral development. His thesis is that 
even if the empathetic moral can explain many aspects of pro-social behaviour, a moral 
theory needs to be referred to some moral principles. The relationship between 
empathetic affections and moral principles is orthogonal30 . 
For example, empathy implies the ability of putting yourself in someone else’s 
shoes, so it is orthogonal with the respect of individuals’ rights, though producing a 
deep motivation to justice. An observer can be motivated by empathy to help a person 
an, at the same time, consider take care of others as a duty.  
With regard to the three fundamental principles of morality, empathy is orthogonal 
with the deontological principle, since we feel that helping a person in trouble is our 
moral duty (putting ourselves in his shoes); empathy is orthogonal with the 
consequentialist principle because we take the responsibility of our actions thinking 
about the consequences of our actions and about how we could feel in the same 
situation; and it is orthogonal with the partiality principle, when we take into account 
the particular “familiarity” and sharing we have with other people.   
To sum up: if the majority of moral dilemmas raises empathy because they imply 
visible and invisible victims, present or future, orthogonality among empathy and 
moral principles allows to weaken the bias to which the further is subjected, to activate 
the moral imagination and to elaborate the judgement.  
Even if the moral judgement is not completely determined by rules, it “[ ...] is not 
arbitrary. […] We do not judge blindly, but reacting to the particular given situation, on 
the basis of some reasons.” 31. 
So we should pay serious attention not only to the different elements of the moral 
judgement, but also to the process through which we formulate it. It is also because we 
are aware of this process that we can give reasons to ourselves and to others for our 
decisions.  
 
THE ETHICAL COMPETENCE 
The elaboration of the moral judgement and the concrete practice of the 
decisional process implied by a particular judgement can be defined as ethical 
competence. There are many and problematic definitions of competence32. I think 
that the definition by Cepollaro is very interesting: according to him “competences 
are not things”33. Nor they are knowledges or skills, even if they imply both of them. 
To understand their nature, it is possible to define them as emergent properties, 
 
30 M.L Hoffman,  Empathy and Moral Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2000, p. 221. 
31 C. Larmore,  Patterns of Moral Complexity, op. cit., p. 22. 
32 See P.G. Bresciani, Capire la competenza, Franco Angeli, Milano 2012. 
33 G. Cepollaro, Le competenze non sono cose, Guerini e Associati, Milano 2008. 
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relational, connected to uses and contexts.  This means that these competences emerge 
from real intersubjective 
practises 34.  
Being related to fluxes of communication, competences are dynamic and cannot be 
reduced to the conditions of their emergence. This implicates their retroactivity with 
regard to the initial conditions and the transformation of these conditions. 
Therefore, competences are not “things” or “sets” that can be learnt and applied to a 
system, since their fundamental characteristic is that they are related to a context, 
locals, situated, evolving in the contexts where they emerge. They contribute to the 
evolution of the contexts by generating new ones. So interpreted, competences can be 
seen as a bricolage of knowledge and ability to act in determined contexts, where they 
represent knowledge in action and the ability to use given resources.  
With regard to the ethical competence, this is a basic competence, since it is 
transverse and influential on more specific competences. Since the moral dilemmas 
regard intersubjective relationships in determined contexts, the ethical competence 
emerges as an answer -  as taking the responsibility of these dilemmas.  
More in details, it consists in the definition of which ethics fundamental principles 
have to be endorsed in a specific context, taking also into account the orthogonality 
with the emotions and, first of all, with empathy.  
In addition, acting in a way ethically driven, when there are dilemmas or moral 
conflicts, can contribute to determine a moral co-evolution of the interested subjects or, 
at least, if there is not a possible solution, to formulate and/or recognize rules and ways 
of conflict management and cohabitation.  
The ethical competence is, therefore, an expression of the dynamic-cultural and 
operative balance people can find among themselves and the context and it is done by 
subjects who can diagnose the environment where they operate and produce complex 
performances, actions, relations adequate to the context itself on the basis of the 
decisions they have to justify.  
Inside complex organizations, the ethical competence requires to take into account 
stakeholders’ needs, to choose, after reflecting, priorities, having in mind a generative 
vision of ethics that should be implemented and supported by all, but especially, by he 
who has directive functions and responsibilities.   
A deep moral sense endorses the development of clear and positive relationships 
among all the stakeholders. As said by Damon, morality is not a constraining power 
that forces people to be honest and to avoid problems, but, on the contrary, it realizes a 
fecund source of motivation, inspiration and innovation35. Therefore, choices and 
behaviours founded on moral decisions strengthen negotiation and cooperation and 
generate influential relationships able to determine the well-being for all stakeholders 
in a structured system.  
 
34 See ivi, p. 30. 
35 See, W. Damon, The Moral Advantage,     
in “Optimise” 2002, http://www.optimizemag.com/issue/003/ethics.htm. 
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MORAL DECISION AND LIMITS OF ETHICAL COMPETENCE 
Since now I have underlined the different “elements” of the moral judgment, the 
complexity of the process of its construction that results in the ethical competence. I 
was not able to propose a definition. Due to the fact that it does not imply the mere 
compliance to rules, a standard definition looks like impossible. As said, the moral 
judgement is not arbitrary, since we answer to emergences in particular situations on 
the basis of some reasons. The moral decision implicates a judgement that merges 
rationality requests with moral sentiments, the biographical dimension and the 
experiences of each of us, and the context where it has to be made. This means that, 
when formulating the moral judgement, it is not requested a theoretical rationality 
nor a generic reference to empathy (or to other moral sentiments), but a practical 
sensibleness able to merge rationality and empathy. In addition, it is also thanks to 
the awareness of the process through which we elaborate a moral judgement that we 
give reasons, to ourselves and to others, of the decisions we make.  
The deontological, consequentialist and partiality principles can be identified as 
the fundamental principles of the moral. Above them, we have to face other moral 
principles like the principle of promptness, beneficiality, justice, responsibility, 
respect for autonomy etc. Let me define the first principles, which are fundamental, 
as first order principles, while the others can be grouped in a second order.  
In fact, we use the latter on the basis of deontological, consequentialist or 
partiality considerations.  
Our moral experience is complex since, in the light of the heterogeneity of the 
moral, it merges a plurality of factors. The judgment is expressed on the basis of the 
definition of a hierarchy among the fundamental principles of the moral 
(deontological, consequentialist, partiality), which is elaborated, from time to time, 
taking into account the context where we have to act. This choice guides the use of 
some principles which I define as second order principles (freedom, beneficiality, 
justice, etc.) and it contributes to give reasons for our actions. For example, I can 
believe to act for the right because I am pursuing an obligation or because I am 
evaluating the consequences of what I am going to do.  
The reference to this or that principle, pertaining to the first order or to the 
second order, can be guided by factors like empathy, biographic experiences, cultural 
tradition, negotiating needs, relational needs or even by a mix of these factors. Since 
– as I tried until now to demonstrate – we do not decide on ethically relevant issues 
following formal criteria of internal consistency following our preferences, but we 
decide to take into account a plurality of factors like information and evaluations 
related to the context where we have to decide, when we have to give reasons for our 
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actions (to ourselves and to others) we need to refer to a contextual principle of 
justification that could be formulated as follows:  
 
We are requested to give reasons for decisions, choices and actions in the light of 
the ways through which we arrive to recognize the priority to one of the principles of 
the first order and we connect them to the principles of the second order, taking into 
account the specific context where we are situated when deciding. 
 
The moral judgment, in itself, is not able to overcome the moral conflict nor it is 
always expressible. It has to face the rational conflict that can be considered as the 
effect of the limits of our reason. Even if we try hard to give reasons, a profound 
moral dilemma can be irresolvable and so it represents a conflict. For example, the 
urgency reasons that can be invoked to sustain priority in the consequentialist 
principle could not necessarily be of the same intensity for everybody.   
Larmore affirms that when consequentialist reasons are in conflict with 
deontological reasons of the strictest type, we should suspend the judgment on which 
of the two principles represents an obligation for us (but we have to decide which of 
the two principles we want to follow) 36. So he proposes a sort of epochè (suspension 
of judgement) when we think that we could have more information that could modify 
our view of the situation. The problem is that we cannot always have access to more 
information related to a conflict. Sometimes we have to admit that there are some 
irresolvable conflicts. This can happen in the relationship with others, but even with 
the relationship with ourselves. This is the case when we feel obliged to act in the 
light both of the deontological principle and of the consequentialist principle, since 
both of them require actions we think as acceptable, but, indeed, obligatory. In these 
cases – as said by Larmore – we do not have a deficit in our knowledge, but, on the 
contrary, we know too much, that is, we know that we are obliged to do the action 
that we consider the best one from both the deontological and the consequentialist 
points of view37. 
Are we facing a defeat? Does admitting the heterogeneity of the moral implicate 
the impossibility to decide? Should we come back to foundationalist morals? Let us 
start with this last question.  
Firstly, I would say that rationally recognizing that we do not infer the 
fundamental principles of the moral but actually we find them, and that these 
represent the undeniable connections enabling us to look at ourselves as moral 
agents – whichever our vision of good life is – does not implicate any metaphysic of 
the moral subject, nor the need to look for foundations outside the moral itself.   
 
36 C. Larmore, op. cit., p. 149 
37 Ivi, p. 150. 
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In this regard, the principle of contextual justification recalls the fact that 
whichever the justification we give to our actions is, it has to be referred to a specific 
context. This means that, even if the moral principles justify actions, they do not 
have justifications since they represent assumptions of our rationality. I agree on 
Larmore’s idea following which the fundamental principles, having the 
aforementioned characteristics, establish the limits of the moral intelligibility38.  
 In this regard, I think that we have to add another reflection: when facing an 
irresolvable moral conflict and the necessity to decide, we have to acknowledge that 
there are some obligations we cannot respect, so that moral decisions where 
fundamental principles are in conflict are always difficult. Among the contexts as 
they are and as they ought to be, there is our ability to do things, but we have to be 
aware that “Our possibilities in the world are then too narrow for what we know we 
ought to do”39.  
I do not think this represents a defeat: on the contrary this represents the realistic 
acknowledgement of our limits, of the necessity to know them and to face them 
constantly.  
This is the conclusion of the journey that has taken us from φρόνησις to ethical 
competence, thanks to which we have seen how is it possible to build the moral 
judgement and which are its limits. 
Aristotle had a great intuition when putting the judgment at the core of the moral 
reflection and even if he has nothing to say to us with regard to the heterogeneity of the 
moral, and the φρόνιμος does not correspond to he who is ethically competent 40, it 
contributes, still today, to remind us that this centrality does not involve the eclipse of 
the role of the reason. The idea of practical reasonableness, that is involved in the 
practise of the ethical competence, is connected with Aristotle’s intuition and represents 
an alternative to the ethical monism and to the Rational Choice Theory in a social and 
relational ethics perspective.  
 
 
38 Ibidem. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Φρόνιμος  is he who can decide on the good life in general, while the ethics competence is 
situated, contextual and does not imply nor a vision of the good life in itself, nor a perfectionistic idea 
of human nature. As J. Annas  points out,  « [...] Plato and Aristotle, insist that working for a living was 
incompatible with developing the virtues; Thus virtue and skill, would not naturally be considered as 
forming aspects of the same life.». (J. Annas, op.cit., P.72). Ethical competence, on the contrary, allows 
to deal with moral dilemmas emerging from professional practices 
 
 
